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On Public Language and Private Language1
Rohit Parikh
I am driving along on I95 after teaching a late evening class and a truck driver,
annoyed at the fact that I am driving only 65, gives me a nudge. When I wake up in
the hospital, something strange has happened. Objects that looked blue before, look
green, and vice versa. I can see out the window, and if I could still speak as before,
I would say “My God! The sky is green”. However, I have quite forgotten my use of
color words and all my memories are black and white.
Of course, I have to relearn my use of color words. I find that the color of the sky
is called “blue” and the color of leaves is called “green”. Pretty soon, I seem to be
back to normal and I go off to the Bahamas to enjoy the hefty payment that I receive
from the trucking company. Of course, I am now using the words “blue” and “green”
in a different way; one might almost say that I am unwittingly speaking Hinglish,
a language that sounds like English but the color words are different. And no one
knows the difference, not even I.
“But hold on”, you say. “You are still speaking English. The fact that no one can
tell the difference is proof that you belong to the same linguistic community. English
is not a private language! The words ‘blue’ and ‘green’ were meant to be the names of
colors. What monstrous arrogance to think that they were names for your sensations!
And anyway, what sense does it make to talk of a change having taken place, if no
one knows that it did?”
Perhaps you are right, but things do not stop there. I return from the Bahamas
and have another accident. This time I am the one who nudges the truck driver. When
I am released from the emergency room after being treated for cuts and lacerations,
I find that my memory has returned and I am suddenly struck by amazement. Now I
remember that the sky used to look green to me (I am now talking in Hinglish), but
that I used to call it “blue”. All the facts fall into place and I understand exactly
what happened after the first accident. Since my sensations do not go back to the
old state, I continue to speak Hinglish, but my utterances are regarded as normal by
English speakers2 .
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A familiar device in Philosophy takes the following form. If two things or situations resemble
each other in aspect A but not in aspect B, then B cannot be defined in terms of A. An example of
this technique occurs in Putnam’s twin earth example, “the Meaning of Meaning”, Mind, Language
and Reality, Camridge University Press 1975, esp. pp. 223-227. Here Putnam uses the “twin earth”
to argue that if meanings determine extension, then meanings cannot be “in the head”. Another
example occurs in Dennett’s “Where am I?”, the Mind’s Eye, Ed. Hofstadter and Dennett, pp.
217-229, Bantam books 1981. Here Dennett seems to argue that Dennett is not necessarily where
his brain is. In this paper I am using a similar device to argue that arguments against private
language, for all their force, are not decisive.
2
Wittgenstein, at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations, gives us a quote from Augustine’s
account of language acquisition by children, and says (section 32) “Augustine describes the learning
of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language
of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one.” However, Wittgenstein
does not consider the question of what would happen if the child did have a language, only not this
one.

But now I am troubled by another worry. If I think of myself as having color
perceptions of type X before the first accident, and of type Y after, what about other
people? Is everyone born an X or are some people Y? Or is everyone different from
everyone else? There seems to be no way to find out. Talking about the matter
is useless since the difference in perceptions, if any, would be cancelled out by a
corresponding difference in the process of learning the color words.
Before we proceed any further with this problem, let me convince you, by a second
example, that the sort of events I have imagined as taking place are not logically
incoherent, and that we need not depend on the malevolence of truck drivers to
discover philosophical puzzles.
Suppose that some time when I am asleep, tiny television cameras are implanted
in my eyes, tiny mikes in my ears and a micromoog in my throat. (The Cognitive
Science group at CUNY has received a huge grant to carry out this experiment and
they are doing this whole bit in great secrecy.) The cameras project the same image
on my retina that a lens would have projected, and the mike sends the same electrical
impulses to my brain that my eardrums would have sent. To conbine two of Quine’s
felicitous phrases, they are observationally transparent. The micromoog picks up the
signals going to my vocal cords and makes the same sounds that I was intending to
make. When I wake up, I notice no difference.
A few days later, a switch is thrown and the cameras start projecting green for
blue and blue for green on my retina. Of course I notice the difference at once. But
I am unable to tell anyone about it. The mike and the moog are now coding and
decoding sounds in a strange way.
Let X be the set of all words of English plus the set of possible nonsense words
which can be constructed using the sounds of English. Thus the sounds “brillig” and
“tove” belong to X, but not, say, “Uberhaupt”. Let f be a one-one function from
X onto X such that if w is a meaningful word of English then f (w) is not. g is the
inverse of f . g also converts meaningful words to nonsense words. This is possible
since meaningful words are a minority among all possible words of a reasonable length.
Now, after the switch is thrown, the mike and the moog have the following properties. If I try to say w, the moog says f (w). If someone says x to me, I hear g(x). So
I try to tell people that the sky has turned green, I hear myself saying “the sky has
turned green”, but no one seems to understand me. Also, for some strange reason,
people seem to me to have started speaking some strange language whose sounds
convey nothing to me.
However, slowly, I learn to talk. I come to know that the sky is a color that people
call “brup”, where “brup” is g(“blue”). I also see that if I point to the sky and say
“brup”, people smile at me and pat me on the back. I do not realise that when I try
to say “brup”, the moog says “blue”, and people are happy to see that I am relearning
some English. As far as I am concerned, “blue” is useless. It only brings frowns. But
if I say “brup”, I hear “brup”, and everyone is happy. Am I still speaking in English?
The two examples above seem to describe a sort of middle ground between public
and private domain. They fall in the public domain in the sense that other people

could have a similar experience, the TV camera, the mike and the moog would be
available for inspection, and anyway, I did describe them to you in English (the
language of this paper) didn’t I?
On the other hand, If another person described a similar experience and I trusted
him (why shouldn’t I? I had it myself too) I still would not have any way of knowing
if he went from being an X to a Y , like me, or from Y to X, or perhaps from U to V ,
where U and V might be sensations that I have never had at all! It looks as if I can
know that his sensations have changed, but he and I cannot coherently talk about
what it is that has changed.
The conclusion seems to be that one cannot talk of sensations in a purely behavioristic way or claim that they do not exist. It does seem as if it does not make sense
to talk of the sensation blue as being the same as the color blue, for my experience
changed the one and not the other.
At the same time, the sensations themselves can never be talked about, since it
seems impossible to have words describing them in English or in any other language.
So the common way of talking, where we assume that other people have the same or
similar sensations, seems also to be flawed. One alternative that is left seems to be a
semi-solipsistic one, that when I talk about other people’s sensations, then I am only
talking about my own, projected onto other people. So, for that matter, are they,
and we really are not speaking the same language.
What then can be the public function of language and what kind of uniformity
can a linguistic community have? A picture that has been very tempting in semantics
is that of a sentence as a kind of wrapping for the real thing, which is the meaning of
the sentence. When I speak to you and you understand me, then I have succeded in
passing on to you the meaning, which is the contents of the package. Thus what you
got from the communication is the same as what I gave. Even Quine might grant that
this picture is justified at least for purely observational sentences. But now it looks
as if this picture cannot be right. Perhaps what I say to you influences your behavior
(in the best cases) in a direction that I had anticipated, but what I say means more
to you then just that, and what that “more” is, is something that we cannot share
or talk about.
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